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INTERNATIONALIZATION 
OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY:
What Went Wrong?
Vladimir Popov
The opening up of the previously closed centrally planned
economies (CPEs) is one of the most remarkable developments of the
1990s because it means that the last large group of countries previously
isolated from the world economy is now part of the globalization
process. With the exception of China and Vietnam, however, market
reforms and internationalization in former communist countries have
been accompanied by mounting economic hardship; output and real
incomes fell markedly, and mortality and crime rates increased. In
Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) states, the costs of transi-
tion have been especially high, much higher than in East European
countries (Tables 1 and 1A in the Appendix).
To what extent were the costs of transition in general and in Russia
in particular associated with the opening up of the previously closed
economies? Could these costs have been avoided if reformers were
pursuing a different strategy of internationalization?
One popular observation is that the disruption of the Comecon
trade in 1991 and of the inter-republican trade within the FSU in 1992–
95 contributed a great deal to the poor performance of East European
(EE) and FSU countries. The other view, however, is that the collapse
of these trade flows was more or less inevitable, since they were based
on prices that were so different from the world market prices; these
trade flows were inefficient and were supposed to be reshaped and
restructured in any case, whereas the real problem was the lack of a
consistent policy of liberalization.
These two approaches correspond to two schools of thought in a
more general debate between “shock therapists” and “gradualists.”
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The question why the FSU had to pay a greater price for economic
transition is answered differently by those who advocate shock ther-
apy and those who support gradual, piecemeal reforms. Shock thera-
pists argue that much of the cost of the FSU reforms should be
attributed to inconsistencies in the policies followed — namely, to the
slow pace of reforms and to the inability of the governments and cen-
tral banks to fight inflation in 1992–95. The supporters of gradual tran-
sition, however, blame the attempt to introduce the conventional
shock-therapy package for all the disasters and misfortunes.
In order to answer the question about the costs of transition and the
costs of internationalization in particular, we should discuss the issue
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Table 1 Russia: General Economic and Social Indicators, 1989–98
Indicator/Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
GDP, 1989=100% 96 91 78 72 62 60 57 57 53
Gross fixed investment, 100 85 51 45 34 30 25 23 21
1989=100% 29 24 25 21 22 21 21 20 19
— as a % of GDP
Employment, 100 98 95 94 91 88 87 85 84
1989=100%
Unemployment rate, — — 4.8 5.6 7.4 8.2 9.3 11.3 12.5
year-end, %
Government revenues, % 41.0** — 44.2 36.1 34.6 32.2 30.4 27.9 24
of GDP
Inflation (CPI, annual 6 93 1526 875 307 198 48 17 50
average, %)
Share of resource 24.2 23.7 43.9 43.8 46.5 48.1 51.1 — —
industries*** in total 
industrial output 
(current prices), %
Export, billion US dollars 140.1 108.5 80.7 63.6 67.5 81.1 89.1 87.0 75
— to non-CIS countries 63.2 50.9 42.4 44.3 50.5 60.8 62.3 68.2 60
Real personal disposable 100 116 63 74 83 72 72 75 65
incomes, 1990=100%
Gini coefficient (income), % — 26 28.9 39.8 40.9 38.1 37.5 — —
Average pension as a % 33 33 26 34 34 38 38 34 —
of average wage
Average pension as a % 47 40 38 44 37 34 39 36 —
of average income
Share of wages and 48.8 43.7 35.5 38.5 38.2 30.0 26.5 29 —
salaries in GDP, %
* Estimate. ** 1989. *** Fuel and energy, steel and non-ferrous metals.
Source: EBRD (1995), (1996), (1997); ECE (1997); Goskomstat; PlanEcon.
in the framework of the general model, which allows us to place the
internationalization factors in perspective and to evaluate their roles.
The framework I propose in this essay is based on the assumption that
the speed of reform per se (shock versus gradual transition) did not
matter a great deal. The unique magnitude of the recession was caused
primarily by two groups of factors: first, by greater distortions in the
industrial structure and external trade patterns on the eve of the transi-
tion and, second, by the collapse of state and non-state institutions,
which occurred in the late 1980s to early 1990s and resulted in chaotic
transformation through crisis management instead of organized and
manageable transition. This strong institutional framework should be
held responsible for the success of gradual reforms in China and shock
therapy in Vietnam, where strong authoritarian regimes were pre-
served and CPE institutions were not dismantled before new market
institutions were created, as well as for the relative success of radical
reforms in East European (especially in Central European) countries,
where strong democratic regimes and new market institutions
emerged quickly. The collapse of the strong state and institutions that
started in the USSR in the late 1980s and continued in the successor
states in the 1990s explains the extreme length, if not the extreme
depth, of the FSU transformational recession.
To put it differently, the Gorbachev reforms of 1985 – 91 failed not
because they were gradual but because of the weakening of the state
institutional capacity leading to the inability of the government to con-
trol the flow of events. Similarly, the Yeltsin reforms in Russia, as well
as economic reforms in most other FSU states, were so costly not
because of the shock therapy or the lack of it, but because the institu-
tions needed to enforce law and order and carry out manageable tran-
sition collapsed.
It is argued in the essay that the greater magnitude of the Russian
recession was caused mostly not by the slow speed of liberalization
but, rather, by worse initial conditions (larger distortions in industrial
sector and trade patterns inherited from the era of central planning)
and by the collapse of institutions that occurred during transition.
Opening up of the Russian economy (deregulation of foreign trade and
introduction of the convertibility of the ruble) resulted in a sharp
decline of exports and imports and thus contributed greatly to the gen-
eral reduction of output. To a large extent, this was inevitable, since the
trade flows and industrial structures of former socialist countries were
perverted and could not have been sustained without sacrificing eco-
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nomic efficiency. However, the harsh impact of internationalization on
the Russian economy was strengthened by the inappropriate policies.
It is argued that the Russian government mishandled the internation-
alization process in at least three major ways: (1) by sustaining, in
1995–98, the overvalued exchange rate of the ruble and provoking the
currency crisis, (2) by sticking to import substitution industrial strat-
egy and failing to stimulate export-oriented growth, and (3) by not
using the potential for attracting foreign direct investment.
II. Evaluating the Impact of Internationalization: 
Framework for Analysis
Initial conditions for market-type reforms in Russia were not so favor-
able as in EE countries or in China and Vietnam. Indeed, if transforma-
tional recession is viewed as a supply-side phenomenon, as a
structural adjustment process resulting from the need to overcome dis-
proportions inherited from the centrally planned economy (CPE), then
high militarization, overindustrialization, underdevelopment of the
service sector, “under-openness” of the economy, and the perverse
structure of trade among former Soviet republics and among socialist
countries obviously put the pre-transition Russian (and Soviet) econ-
omy at a disadvantage.
To begin with, a much higher share of GDP was absorbed by
defense expenditure—about 15 percent in the USSR in the 1980s com-
pared with 1 – 5 percent in major Western countries and 5 – 10 percent
in most other socialist countries.1
All CPEs were overindustrialized at the expense of the service sec-
tor, especially at the expense of trade and financial services, which
were relatively underdeveloped. The Soviet economy, however, was
more defense- and investment-oriented than other CPEs, and the Rus-
sian industrial structure was “heavier” than that of other Soviet
republics. While the share of industry in GDP in Russia before the
transition was not that different from other countries, the share of least
efficient engineering (machine production) in total industrial output
was markedly higher. In 1990, engineering accounted for 46 percent of
employment and 31 percent of output of the industrial sector — more
than even in the most industrialized country of the Eastern bloc,
Czechoslovakia (40 and 30 percent, respectively), and much more than
in Poland (32 and 28 percent, respectively).2
Macalester International Vol. 7
212
By contrast, in other republics the share of machinery and equip-
ment industries in total industrial employment in 1990 was only 38
percent (less than 30 percent, if Ukraine and Belarus are excluded).
Russia’s position versus all other republics except for Ukraine and
Belarus was that of a net exporter of resources and machinery and a
net importer of food and light-industry products.
Another disproportion created by central planning—the productiv-
ity gap between resource-based industries and secondary manufactur-
ing—is unique to the former Soviet republics and virtually nonexistent
in other CPEs. Due to obvious natural environment factors, the Soviet,
and especially the Russian, economy was more resource-oriented than
other CPEs, and resource industries developed into the most efficient
part of the Soviet industrial potential. Their productivity (as compared
to the world level) was several times higher than that in secondary
manufacturing. While the productivity gap between industry and agri-
culture is common for many countries (not only for the CPEs, but also
for most emerging market economies), only countries with an abun-
dance of natural resources may develop a highly efficient and compet-
itive resource sector. Changes in price structure during transition —
bringing domestic prices in line with world prices — caused much
greater adjustment problems in the former Soviet Union than in East
European countries where domestic resource prices were kept roughly
at the world level.
Also, the collapse of the inter-republican trade (which should be
attributed not to the breakdown of the Union itself but to changes in
relative prices that made it impossible for the fuel-importing republics
to finance their trade deficits with Russia) contributed considerably to
the depth of the recession in the former Soviet republics.
As the data in Table 2 show, when trade flows among former Soviet
republics are recalculated in world prices, Russia had a surplus of
about 6 percent of GNP, whereas ten out of the remaining fourteen for-
mer Soviet republics ran absolutely unsustainable trade deficits in the
range of 9 – 30 percent of GDP. Not surprisingly, changes in relative
prices resulted in a tremendous reduction of Russian exports, from 13
percent of GNP in 1988 to only about 4 percent in 1995. While resource
exports to republics were partly reoriented to other countries, the
sharp reduction of finished-goods exports (mostly machinery and
equipment) led to the decrease in output.
To summarize, the legacy of central planning in former Soviet
republics proved to be much worse than in East European countries:
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because restructuring and adjustment were supposed to proceed on a
much greater scale, they were associated with the larger reduction of
output.
Distortions in industrial sector (militarization, overindustrializa-
tion, etc.) and distortions at the micro level (the size and specialization
of enterprises) are more difficult to overcome if they are embodied in
fixed assets and if these fixed assets are sizeable compared to GDP. It
may be argued that, in poor agricultural economies, distortions were
not “cast in stone” since the relatively primitive fixed capital stock was
less susceptible to distortions and, even if distorted, was not so large
compared with GDP and investment as it was in more advanced
industrialized transition economies.
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Table 2 Trade Flows and Trade Balances for the Republics, 1988, 
as a % of GNP
Republics Trade flowsa Trade balance
Domestic Foreign Domesticb Foreign Total, in Total in
domestic  world
prices prices
USSR 21.11 8.27 –0.01(–0.14) –5.76 –5.78 0.21
Russia 12.92 9.37 0.05 (0.02) –6.28 –6.23 5.76
Ukraine 26.90 7.14 2.55 (–0.3) –4.61 –2.05 –2.04
Belarus 44.56 7.39 11.14 (–1.6) –5.42 –5.72 –5.78
Lithuania 47.26 7.21 –6.56 (4.0) –5.83 –12.39 –29.97
Latvia 46.85 7.21 –1.03 (5.2) –6.18 –7.21 –13.39
Estonia 50.11 8.79 –5.27 (5.3) –7.03 –12.31 –22.86
Moldova 45.88 6.37 –1.87 (5.6) –7.86 –9.74 –24.34
Armenia 47.85 5.84 –4.23 (-2.5) –9.70 –13.92 –17.40
Georgia 37.88 5.90 1.98 (–4.9) –6.15 –4.17 –13.43
Azerbaijan 35.38 5.95 13.89 (–2.6) –6.61 –7.28 –3.31
Kazakhstan 29.48 4.69 –14.47(–1.3) –5.09 –19.56 –17.69
Uzbekistan 34.10 5.62 –5.78 (–1.4) –0.59 –6.37 –8.71
Turkmenistan 37.58 4.60 –1.53 (–3.0) –3.07 –4.60 0.00
Kirghizia 39.65 5.98 –7.21 (0.4) –10.24 –17.45 –15.86
Tadjikistan 37.70 6.01 –15.32 (3.0) –2.10 –17.42 –16.52
a (Exports+Imports):(2xGNP), at domestic prices, assuming the same GNP/NMP ratios
for the republics as for the USSR as a whole. Domestic trade is trade with the rest of the
Union. Foreign trade is trade with the rest of the world.
b Estimates of the balance of tourist trade are shown in brackets.
Source: Stabilization, Liberalization and Devolution: Assessment of the Economic Situation and
Reform Process in the Soviet Union. A report prepared by Commission of the European
Communities, December 1990, p. 173. Data are derived from official Soviet statistics;
Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu (National Economy of the USSR in 1989),
Moscow, 1990, p. 638.
Ceteris paribus, the low level of economic development (in particu-
lar, the lower capital/output ratio) is an asset rather than a liability —
that is, there are some “advantages of backwardness.”3 The conven-
tional understanding of this term, introduced by Gerschenkron,
implies that countries with lower levels of economic development
(lower GDP per capita) can benefit from the technological achieve-
ments and the experience of richer countries through international
exchanges; as a result, they may enjoy higher rates of growth that
allow them to “catch up” (converge) with the richer countries. This
general argument has an additional dimension for transition
economies. Because of distortions in infrastructure and other fixed
capital stock created by decades of central planning, the need for
restructuring was greater in the socialist economies with higher capi-
tal/output ratios (i.e., a higher level of economic development).
China generally managed to escape the restructuring problem due
to “advantages of backwardness” resulting from the low level of eco-
nomic development. Its economy was based mostly on agriculture4
and the capital/labor ratio was low, so the centrally planned economy
did not create disproportions in the stock of fixed capital (simply
because there was not much of it). Chinese reformers usually were not
overburdened by the legacy of the CPE in the sense that they were not
constrained by distorted infrastructure in industry and especially in
agriculture. Chinese agricultural communes with very little fixed capi-
tal stock (except land) proved to be much more reformable than Soviet
and East European collective and state farms, with their huge super-
centralized infrastructures poorly suited for family farms. Township
and village enterprises (TVEs), which became the major growth sector
of the Chinese economy, emerged pretty much from scratch.5
The Chinese economy probably would have done no worse than it
actually did if shock therapy (immediate deregulation of prices and
withdrawal of subsidies) instead of gradual reforms had been intro-
duced in the late 1970s. This argument is supported by the example of
Vietnam, which followed a different reform path (overnight deregula-
tion of most prices and unification of multiple and black market
exchange rates in March 1989), but also managed to avoid transforma-
tional recession.6
To what extent did pre-transition structural distortions contribute to
the extreme magnitude of the Russian recession and to what extent
was it exacerbated by poor economic policies? Attempts to separate
non-policy from policy factors by running multiple regressions pro-
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duce some statistically satisfactory and economically meaningful
results.7 These results suggest that the usual argument linking the bet-
ter performance of EE, especially the Central European countries (as
compared to the FSU, especially the CIS countries), to better economic
policies (greater liberalization and lower inflation) does not necessarily
hold.8 Indeed, it may be shown that the identification and decomposi-
tion of the “FSU effect” may be carried out more effectively by bring-
ing into the equation such non-policy factors as initial conditions (the
pre-transition level of development and relative magnitude of the dis-
tortions in trade and industrial structure) and the impact of wars
(Table 4A in the Appendix). Once these variables characterizing initial
conditions are factored in, the liberalization index becomes insignifi-
cant.
There is a fairly strong correlation between aggregate distortions in
industrial and trade structure before transition and the subsequent
performance during transition, as measured by the GDP change (fig.
1). Among countries with minor aggregate distortions (less than 30
percent of GDP) are three former Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croa-
tia, Macedonia), the Czech and Slovak republics, Hungary, China, and
Vietnam. All these countries, with the exception of war-affected Mace-
donia, are doing better than most other transition economies. On the
other hand, among countries with the most distorted economies
(aggregate distortions of more than 50 percent of GDP) are all the for-
Macalester International Vol. 7
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Figure 1 Aggregate distortions in industrial structure and external trade
before transition and GDP during transition
Source: Statistical Appendix
mer Soviet republics, except Russia. In fact, aggregate distortions alone
may explain 32 percent of output variations during transition and
about 50 percent of variations if the economies affected by war are
excluded. Taking into account the other two non-policy factors charac-
terizing the initial conditions, we obtain statistically sound and robust
results: more than 60 percent of the variations in performance may be
explained by (1) the advantages of backwardness (i.e., level of GDP per
capita), (2) aggregate distortions, and (3) the war dummy variable
(Table 4A).
In Russia, aggregate distortions amounted to “only” 39 percent of
GDP because of the relatively high openness of the economy as mea-
sured by export/GDP ratio. In fact, aggregate distortions for Russia
(see Table 2A in the Appendix) consist of overmilitarization of the
magnitude of 9 percent of GDP, overindustrialization equal to 15 per-
cent of GDP, “under-openness” of 3 percent of GDP, trade with FSU
republics of 11 percent of GDP, and trade with former socialist coun-
tries of 4 percent of GDP (12%*0.33=4%).
In a sense, FSU countries, Russia included, were doomed to
undergo a deeper recession than other states. This is not to say that
government policy in general does not affect performance, but to
acknowledge that conventional understanding of the policy factors
(progress in liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization) is not
enough to account for all of them. Despite popular belief, it may well
be that most important policy factors affecting performance are not
associated with the speed of liberalization. Rather, these are the policy
measures that preserve or create strong and efficient institutions, facil-
itating the functioning of the market economy.
It is not easy to measure the efficiency of state and non-state institu-
tions. In most FSU and Balkan countries, the collapse of the institutions
is observable in: the dramatic increase of the share of the shadow econ-
omy; the decline of government revenues as a proportion of GDP; the
inability of the state to deliver basic public goods and an appropriate
regulatory framework; the accumulation of tax, trade, wage, and bank
arrears; the demonetization, “dollarization,” and “barterization” of the
economy, as measured by high and growing money velocity; the
decline of bank financing as a proportion of GDP; poor enforcement of
property rights, bankruptcies, contracts, and law and order in general;
increased crime rates; and so on. Most of these phenomena may be
defined quantitatively to produce a remarkable result: China and Viet-
nam are closer in this respect to EE countries than to CIS.9 However,
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the construction of the aggregate index of the efficiency of institutions
is problematic because the rationale for choosing weights is not clear.
One possible general measure is the trust of businesses and individ-
uals in various institutions. By this gauge, FSU states rank much lower
than East European countries in all available surveys. In the global sur-
vey of firms in sixty-nine countries on the credibility of the state insti-
tutions, CIS had the lowest credibility, below that of sub-Saharan
Africa.10 Especially striking was the gap between EE and CIS countries:
differences in the credibility index between South and Southeast Asia
Macalester International Vol. 7
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Figure 2 Government revenues and shadow economy 
as a % of GDP and GDP change, 1989-96
Source: Statistical Appendix
and EE were less pronounced than differences between sub-Saharan
Africa and CIS.
Another good proxy for measuring the institutional capacity of the
state is the financial strength of the government — the share of state
revenues in GDP. Although much has been said about “big govern-
ment” and excessively high taxes in former socialist countries, it is
now rather obvious that the downsizing of the government that
occurred in most CIS states during transition was too radical.
Normally, there is a positive correlation in market economies
between the level of taxation, the share of government revenues in
GDP, and the size of the shadow economy. If taxes are excessive, eco-
nomic agents tend to avoid taxation through underground activity,
including non-reported barter operations.11 In transition economies,
the opposite is true: lower state revenues result in a larger shadow
economy (fig. 2). In fact, there was nearly a one-to-one crowding-out
effect: for every one percentage point that the share of state revenues in
GDP was reduced, the share of the shadow economy increased by one
percentage point. To put it differently, the dynamics of the share of
government revenues in GDP in transition economies quite accurately
measures the ability of the state to enforce rules and regulations. And
it is quite meaningful that the magnitude of the decline in government
revenues is strongly correlated with the decline in output: the larger
the decline in government revenues, the greater the chances for poor
performance (fig. 2).
After adding the decline-in-government-revenues variable to those
that characterize initial conditions (level of development and distor-
tions) and the external environment (war dummy variable), the
explanatory power of the regression increases to 75 percent with the
excellent T-statistics (28 observations). Interestingly, the inclusion of
liberalization variables at this point does not improve regression statis-
tics. Factoring in inflation allows the explanatory power to improve to
84 percent. The correlation coefficient rises further, to 90 percent, if
other indicators of the institutional capacities, such as the share of
shadow economy, are added, though the number of observations in
this case is only seventeen because of the lack of data (Table 4A).
The regression equations suggest, for instance, that the predicted 47
percent decline in GDP in 1989 – 96 in Russia (in reality, 43%) could
have been limited to only 35 percent if the share of government rev-
enues in GDP remained unchanged; in reality, it fell by nineteen per-
centage points. Furthermore, if inflation had remained in 1990 – 95 at
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the level of, say, Hungary (about 20% a year) instead of the actual rate
of more than 500 percent, 1996 GDP would be no more than 10 percent
lower than in 1989.
To sum up, there is ample evidence that differing performances
during transition, after factoring in initial conditions and external envi-
ronment, depend mostly on the strength of institutions and not much
on the progress of liberalization per se.
In political science terms, it is appropriate to distinguish between
strong authoritarian regimes (China, Vietnam, Uzbekistan), strong
democratic regimes (Central European countries), and weak democra-
tic regimes (most FSU and Balkan states). The first two groups are lib-
eral or liberalizing in that they protect individual rights, including
those of property and contracts, while the latter regimes, though
democratic, are less liberal since they lack strong institutions and the
ability to enforce law and order.12
How do the internationalization factors fit into this framework? The
natural way to account for these factors is to add foreign trade and
investment variables to the regression equation to see whether they
improve the results. All over the world, economic growth seems to be
strongly linked to export performance, but the argument in favor of
export-oriented growth for transition economies has additional justifi-
cations. In a sense, if export expansion for all countries is highly desir-
able for improving performance, for transition economies it is a must.
The CPE economies were closed—isolated from the world market and
from world price ratios. Economic growth that occurred in the CPEs
during this isolation led to the emergence of the perverted industrial
structure. A large portion of the created industrial potential was either
stillborn or doomed to collapse once it was allowed to compete freely
with the foreign producers. Since the crucial part of the transition is, by
definition, the opening up of previously closed economies, it literally
means that export-led growth under the circumstances is the only pos-
sible type of growth (fig. 3). The dilemma, in fact, is not between
export-led growth or import substitution, but between export-led
growth and no growth at all. Introduction of the convertibility of
national currencies and withdrawal of protection of domestic indus-
tries make it impossible to achieve growth by relying on the import-
substitution model that created artificial conditions for the growth of
noncompetitive industries in the past.
It is certainly no accident that, so far, in all rapidly developing or
recovering transition economies, the export sector has been the most
Macalester International Vol. 7
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important engine of growth (fig. 3). Countries with industrial policy
designed to promote export and favoring export-oriented industries
(China, Vietnam) were more successful than those that did not exercise
any explicit industrial policy (EE and Baltic countries) and far more
successful than those that retained subsidies to inefficient and non-
competitive industries (CIS). The evidence to support this statement is
in Table 4A, which suggests that after allowing for unequal conditions,
wars, and different institutional capacities of the state in transition
economies, the export variable is still quite significant in explaining
variations in performance and even improves the fit.
If Russian exports would have increased in 1992–96 by a fraction of
four, as they did in Estonia and Lithuania, instead of the actual
increase of 60 percent, the decline in output could have been limited to
Vladimir Popov
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Figure 3 Export/GDP ratios and performance
Source: Statistical Appendix
40 percent instead of the predicted 47 percent — a quite noticeable, if
not dramatic, impact. And there are reasons to believe that the contri-
bution of export factors to general performance is bound to increase,
once the bottom of the recession is reached and output collapse gives
way to economic growth.
The inclusion of the current account variable also improves the
regression results: the better the current account was in 1993 – 95 as a
percentage of GDP, the better was the performance in 1989 – 96 (Table
4A). To put it differently, the growth of export contributed to better
performance, especially when it was not matched by the fast growth of
import, and led to the improvement of current account balance.
On the other hand, the addition of the foreign direct investment
(FDI) variable does not improve the results: the variable is statistically
insignificant and has the wrong sign (the higher the FDI, the lower the
GDP). As I will propose later, this probably means that, in most coun-
tries, FDI has not yet become a noticeable factor of economic growth.
Indeed, in China the inflow of FDI became significant only in the 1990s
(not in the first seven years of reforms considered here), whereas in
most other countries, cumulative inflow of FDI in 1989 – 96 was less
than 5 percent of 1996 GDP.
Was there a chance to ensure faster growth of export, better current
account, and larger inflow of FDI in Russia in the transition period?
Was the government able to adopt an external economic policy more
conducive to growth? In the next sections, I contend that the answer to
the question is positive and that the overvaluation of the ruble in 1995–
98, the import substitution strategy, and the indecisive and passive
attitude toward foreign investment into resource projects resulted in
slower restructuring and deeper recession in 1992 – 95 and deprived
the national economy of the ability to start recovery in 1996–98.
III. Exchange Rate of the Ruble and the 1998 Currency Crisis
Perhaps the most impressive of all currency crises that affected transi-
tion economies was the one that broke out in Russia in August 1998. In
a matter of days, the exchange rate, which had retained stability dur-
ing the preceding three years, lost more than 60 percent of its value;
prices increased by 50 percent in only two months after the crisis, com-
pared with less than 1 percent monthly inflation before the crisis (fig.
4); and real output fell by about 6 percent in 1998 after registering a
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small increase of 0.6 percent in 1997 for the first time since 1989 but is
expected to fall by a similar amount in 1999 (fig. 5).
What is worse, the financial collapse in Russia marked the failure of
the government’s program of macroeconomic stabilization, which had
been pursued for over three years with a fair degree of success. After
experiencing high inflation of several hundred and more percent a
year during the period immediately following the deregulation of
prices on 2 January 1992, Russia finally opted for the program of the
exchange-rate-based stabilization. In mid-1995, the Central Bank of
Russia (CBR), after accumulating foreign exchange reserves and man-
aging to maintain the stable rate of the ruble for the first half of 1995,
Vladimir Popov
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Figure 4 Annual and monthly inflation rates in Russia
Figure 5 Russia’s GDP growth rates, %
introduced a system of the crawling peg — an exchange-rate corridor
with initially pretty narrow boundaries (fig. 6).
The program was based on the decision of the government and CBR
to lower the rates of growth of the money supply and thus to curb
inflation. The goal of the program was to contain, within reasonable
limits, the government budget deficit and to find noninflationary ways
of its financing. On both fronts, the government kept its promises for
three long years (1995 – 98). It managed not to increase the budget
deficit, even though this required drastic expenditure cuts since the
budget revenues, despite all efforts to improve tax collection, contin-
ued to fall (fig.7). It also managed to finance the deficit mostly through
borrowings—partly by selling short-term ruble-denominated treasury
bills (which were also purchased by foreign investors) and partly by
borrowing abroad in hard currency from international financial insti-
tutions, Western governments and banks, and at the Eurobond market.
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Figure 6 Consumer prices, exchange rate of the dollar (Dec. 1994 = 100%)
and the ratio of Russian to US prices (%, bars)
Figure 7 Consolidated government revenues and expenditure, % of GDP
Under such conditions, the CBR had the opportunity to reduce the
rates of growth of the money supply and to retard inflation (fig. 4).
Thus, macroeconomic stabilization became a reality. Immediately
before the crisis, inflation was running at only 6 percent a year (July
1997 – July 1998). The rates of the reduction of output slowed down,
and the country was looking forward to economic growth. Unfortu-
nately, however, the macroeconomic stabilization was based on a
weak foundation of the overvalued exchange rate of the ruble and on
the policy of the CBR to keep the real exchange rate intact — that is, to
proceed with the devaluation of the nominal rate in line with the ongo-
ing inflation. As a result, Russia contracted the “Dutch disease” in
1995, when the exchange rate of the ruble approached some 70 percent
of the purchasing power parity (PPP) and stayed at this level until the
crisis (fig. 6). The previously high export growth rates slowed down
substantially (from 20% in 1995 to 8% in 1996 for total exports and
from 25% to 9%, respectively, for exports to non-CIS states). In 1997,
total exports fell for the first time since 1992. Needless to say, Russia’s
already weak export of manufactured goods was most affected by the
appreciation of the real exchange rate. In 1996, among economies in
transition, Russia, together with Slovenia (by far the richest country
experiencing recovery from 1993), had the smallest gap between
domestic and international prices (Table 3).13
The decrease in the oil prices in the world market in 1997–98 added
insult to injury. The reduction of export accelerated in the first half of
1998; this, together with still rising import, virtually wiped out the
trade surplus, which in 1996 had amounted to $20 billion (fig. 8). The
current account turned negative in the first half of 1998 (fig. 9). Given
the need to service the debt and the continuation of the capital flight
(which is partly captured in the “errors and omissions” in the balance
of payments statistics in fig. 9), the negative current account guaran-
teed disaster.
Thus, the overvaluation of the ruble by itself paved the way for the
currency crisis and caused the outflow of capital from Russia. In fact,
the exchange rate became hardly sustainable in 1998, when the ruble
became vulnerable with respect to short-term capital flows. Foreign
investment into ruble-denominated government treasury bills, which
was allowed by authorities beginning in 1995, quickly increased to
nearly one-third of the $50 billion market for government treasury bills
in 1997 (including investment in the GKO through “gray schemes” —
that is, through resident intermediaries). From February 1998, the total
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amount of T-bills held by nonresidents started to exceed the value of
the country’s foreign exchange reserves.14
Foreign investors, who were estimated to control no less than 10
percent of the shares in the booming Russian stock market (whose cap-
italization surpassed $100 billion in the fall of 1997), began to with-
draw from the market. Since that time until mid-1998 — in just about
nine months—stock prices in dollar terms fell by about 90 percent—to
the lowest level since 1994 (fig. 10). The decision of the CBR to expand
slightly the width of the exchange-rate band from the beginning of
1998 (fig. 6) was a cosmetic measure that has not produced much room
for maneuver. The Central Bank had to increase the refinancing rate to
150 percent in May 1998 to prevent capital from fleeing at a rate of 
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Table 3 Ratio of the Actual Exchange Rate to the PPP Rate of the Dollar
for Selected Economies in Transition (Range of Monthly Averages)
Country /Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Slovenia 0.9–1.4 1.0–1.7 1.4–1.6 1.4–1.6 1.3–1.6 1.1–1.3 1.3–1.3
Hungary 1.9–2.4 1.9–2.0 1.7–1.8 1.6–1.8 1.6–1.8 1.5–1.6 1.7–1.8
Poland 2.1–3.9 1.6–1.9 1.8–2.0 1.8–2.0 2.1–2.3 1.8–2.0 1.8–1.8
Czech Republic 2.5–3.8 3.5–3.1 2.7–3.1 2.5–2.6 2.2–2.5 2.0–2.2 1.9–2.0
Slovak Republic 2.9–3.9 3.0–3.6 2.9–3.0 2.6–2.8 2.4–2.7 2.1–2.3 2.1–2.2
Lithuania — — — — 2.4–3.2 1.8–2.3 1.7–1.8
Romania 1.8–2.6 1.6–5.0 2.8–4.2 2.2–3.1 2.1–2.6 2.1–2.5 2.4–2.6
Bulgaria 3.3–5.1 2.9–10.9 3.0–4.7 2.3–2.8 2.3–3.1 1.8–2.2 1.9–2.8
Ukraine — — — — — 1.8–2.5 1.3–1.7
RUSSIA — 33.0–131.0 10.2–45.7 2.5–8.0 2.4–2.8 1.4–2.4 1.4–1.5
Source: PlanEcon (Data for the second half of 1998 are forecasts for Slovenia, Czech
Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, and Russia. For Slovakia, all 1998 data are forecasts; for
Poland, data for March–December 1998 are forecasts; for Ukraine, data for the fall of
1997 are forecasts; for Lithuania, all 1997 data are forecasts. For Hungary, data are for
January–March 1998 only.)
Figure 8 Russia’s foreign trade, billion dollars
about $1.5 billion a week at a time when foreign-exchange reserves
were at a level of only about $15 billion. Later, the refinancing rate was
lowered, but yields on government securities remained at a level of
nearly 50 percent in real terms and then increased again to more than
100 percent in August.
The central bank and the government, however, maintained the pol-
icy of a strong ruble up to the very last moment, resulting in scan-
dalously high interest rates that eliminated all prospects for economic
recovery, and negotiated a standby package with the IMF. In a sense,
this policy was designed to maintain consumption and imports, to
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Figure 9 Russia’s balance of payments and foreign 
exchange reserves*, billion dollars
Figure 10 Dollar stock prices indices, Dec. 1993 = 100%
*Year-ends, excluding gold
avoid export-oriented restructuring, and to enable Russians to con-
tinue to live beyond their means. The IMF finally provided the first
installment ($4 billion) of the $20 billion package that went directly to
the CBR to replenish vanishing foreign-exchange reserves, but even
this did not calm the investors. Public officials’ statements about the
stability of the ruble — including Yeltsin’s, made three days before
devaluation—actually had the opposite effect.
In retrospect, it seems quite obvious that the crisis was caused by
the unrealistic and counterproductive attempts of the Russian govern-
ment and CBR, as well as of the IMF, to defend the unsustainably high
exchange rate of the ruble. This is not exactly an argument against the
fixed exchange rate but, rather, against the peg at an unrealistically
high level. There is a difference between stable and strong currency:
the former is highly desirable for all countries, but the latter may be an
unaffordable luxury for economies in transition, like Russia, that are
trying to overcome the transformational recession. It may well be,
therefore, that the CBR and the government were right to establish a
sort of a crawling peg for the ruble, but they were wrong to peg the
ruble at such a high level. Had they pegged it at a lower rate and con-
tinued to build up foreign-exchange reserves, the CBR could have
killed more than two birds with one stone. Russian exports and trade
surplus would increase, domestic interest rates would fall, and the
“de-dollarization” of the Russian economy and the inflow of foreign
direct investment would be stimulated. In other words, a weaker ruble
may have allowed the maintenance of higher savings rates without
high interest rates, creating additional stimulus for production, invest-
ment, and exports, while limiting consumption and imports. Keeping
the ruble at a lower level not only might have avoided the currency cri-
sis, but also could have facilitated an export-oriented strategy that
encouraged restructuring and growth.
Most developing and transition countries typically undervalue
domestic currency because they usually need to earn a trade surplus to
finance debt-service payments and capital flight.15 In most poor coun-
tries, the exchange rate of national currencies is low compared with
PPP (Table 4). For resource-rich countries, however, there is a danger
of “Dutch disease,” which arises because resource export is so prof-
itable that it allows a trade surplus even under the overpriced
exchange rate. Thus, Middle East countries (mostly oil exporters) are
the only major group of states in the developing world with the
exchange rate close to PPP (Table 4).
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On the other hand, many other developing countries (including
those rich in resources) pursue the conscious policy of low exchange
rates as part of the general export-orientation strategy. They create a
downward pressure on their currencies by building up foreign-
exchange reserves, and thus are able to limit consumption and imports
and to stimulate exports, investment, and growth.
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Table 4 Ratio of Actual Exchange Rate of National Currencies in $US 
to PPP for Selected Countries in 1993, % (Figures in Brackets—for 1996)
Countries/regions Ratio, % Countries/regions Ratio, %
OECD* 116 Transition economies* 81
— Germany 126 (133) — Central Europe* 54
— Japan 165 (158) — Bulgaria 30 (25)
— U.S. 100 (100) — Croatia 65 (94)
— Portugal 73 (77) — Czech Republic 36 (48)
Developing countries* 44 — Hungary 62 (63)
— Asia* 36 — Poland 48 (59)
— India 24 (23) — Romania 31 (34)
— Indonesia 30 (33) — Slovak Republic 37 (47)
— Korea 72 (81) — Slovenia 69 (78)
— Malaysia (44) — USSR* 91
— Philippines 35 (34) — Armenia (20)
— Thailand 43 (45) — Azerbaijan (32)
— Turkey 54 (48) — Belarus 8 (30)
— Latin America* 46 — Estonia 29 (64)
— Argentina (90) — Georgia (29)**
— Brazil (70) — Kazakhstan (39)
— Chile (43) — Kyrgyz Republic (19)
— Mexico 58 (45) — Latvia 27 (50)
— Peru (56) — Lithuania 19 (47)
— Venezuela (36) — Moldova 14 (28)
— Middle East* 83 — RUSSIA 26 (70)
— Kuwait (67) — Tajikistan (3)
— Saudi Arabia (68) — Turkmenistan (45)
— United Arab Emirates (100) — Ukraine 19 (39)
— Africa* 37 — Uzbekistan (22)
— Ethiopia (20) China 22 (20)
— Mozambique (17) Mongolia (21)
— Nigeria 36 (90) Vietnam (20)
*1990. ** 1995.
Source: UN International Comparison Program (Russian Statistical Yearbook
1997. Moscow, Goskomstat, 1997, p. 698; Finansoviye Izvestiya, November 10,
1995); World Bank, 1998; Transition Report, 1997.
This was the strategy of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, back
when those countries were still poor and were catching up with high-
income states. And it currently is the strategy of many new, emerging
market economies, especially of China, which continues to keep the
exchange rate at an extremely low level (five times lower than the PPP
rate) by accumulating foreign-exchange reserves at a record pace. It is
no accident that all fast-growing economies are notable for their high
and rapidly growing international reserves. China (including Hong
Kong), Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand account for a good
20 percent of total world reserves, whereas the reserves to GDP ratio
for those countries is normally above 20 percent compared with only 8
percent for the world as a whole.16
There are generally two major reasons for relatively low exchange
rates. First, the non-policy factor: the generally lower level of develop-
ment imposes a burden on the balance of payments in the form of the
capital flight and debt-service payments. And second, the policy fac-
tor: the government and central banks consciously underprice the
exchange rate in order to use it as an instrument of export-oriented
growth.
There is no evidence to support the view that transition economies
were just the innocent victims of the movements of capital in the global
economy and were affected by the Asian contagion. First, Bulgaria and
Romania experienced the crisis back in 1996, before the Asian crisis
broke out in July 1997 with the devaluation of the Thailand bath. Sec-
ond, any room for the real appreciation of the national currencies in
transition economies was limited, and the crises were supposed to
occur sooner or later anyway.
The specifics of the exchange-rate policy in transition economies are
determined by, among other factors, the challenge of macroeconomic
stabilization, which policy-makers faced in most post-communist
countries after the deregulation of prices. Economists and policy-mak-
ers tend to disagree on what kind of exchange-rate policy is best for
economies in transition. Some stress the importance of maintaining the
stable nominal exchange rate by fixing it and using exchange-rate-
based stabilization as a nominal anchor to fight inflation.17 Others
claim that real exchange rates are supposed to be kept stable (which
implies constant devaluations, if inflation is higher than elsewhere) so
the actual rate remains substantially below PPP rate in order to stimu-
late export and growth.
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Each approach has its own advantages. Although the first one may
prove useful for fighting high inflation quickly (wherever possible) at
the initial stages of macroeconomic stabilization, the second one may
be better suited for overcoming transformational recession and pro-
moting economic recovery by facilitating the transfer of resources from
domestic demand to exports, which is the pressing need in all
economies in transition.
The conventional shock-therapy approach to macroeconomic stabi-
lization recommends using the pegged exchange rate as a nominal
anchor while pursuing an anti-inflationary policy.18 The rational of this
argument is that a high exchange rate helps hold down inflation by
increasing import competition. In fact, this was the case in many EE
and FSU countries, including Russia in 1995–98.
Some countries in the region introduced currency boards (Estonia,
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina) and initially succeeded
in fighting inflation and promoting growth. Other post-communist
states (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) exercised fixed-
exchange-rate regimes with a fair degree of success as well.
However, virtually all transition economies have experienced an
appreciation of real exchange rates since transition started. This under-
mined the competitiveness of exporters, worsened the current account,
and forced high interest rates (to slow down the capital flight and
attract new foreign financing) at a time when exactly the opposite was
needed. It now appears that even in those countries that avoided the
currency crisis, the real appreciation of the exchange rate becomes a
major policy concern.
In countries that have exercised the currency board arrangements
longer than others (Estonia since June 1992 and Lithuania since Octo-
ber 1994), domestic prices continue to grow despite the stability of the
nominal exchange rate. Due to real appreciation of their currencies, the
current account deficit in 1998 increased to more than 10 percent of
GDP, and its financing totally depends on the inflow of foreign capital.
Until now, both countries managed to withstand the Asian crisis and
the Russian crisis, but their growth rates in 1998 fell significantly, and
the prospects for 1999 are not encouraging.
The policy of keeping the real exchange rate stable, instead of peg-
ging the nominal rate, appears to appeal more to policy-makers since
the currency crises of 1996–98—especially because countries pursuing
this kind of policy for quite some time are doing no worse than others.
Zettermeyer and Citrin find that money-based stabilization was suc-
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cessful in several countries (Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, FYR Macedo-
nia), and nothing suggests that it is an inferior strategy to pegging the
exchange rate for fighting inflation.19 With an appropriate monetary
policy (at least partial sterilization of increases in the money supply
caused by the buildup of foreign-exchange reserves, the inflationary
pressure may be dealt with, as proven by the example of many emerg-
ing market economies.
Unlike other measures to promote growth, a low exchange rate may
be implemented relatively easily since it favors the interests of all pow-
erful industrial groups by creating stimulus for the export-oriented
sector; it also provides protection from import competition in indus-
tries dependent primarily on the domestic market. The costs of such a
policy (limits on consumption) are paid by unorganized and politically
noninfluential consumers. In addition, a low-exchange-rate policy is
better than trade protectionism because it is not associated with cor-
ruption: it benefits all exporters without leaving space for bureaucratic
discretion in selecting priority industries and enterprises. (Devaluation
cannot be stolen, as they say in Russia.)
Like many other economists, I strongly believed before the crisis
broke out that the ruble had been overvalued, arguing that if it was not
devalued “from above” in advance, it probably would get devalued
“from below,” in the form of the currency crisis, with much greater
costs.20 In a sense, it was not so difficult to predict the crisis, which
numerous scholars did several months before it occurred. Even Jeffrey
Sachs, earlier a strong advocate of the exchange-rate-based stabiliza-
tion, spoke out publicly in favor of devaluation in June 1998.21
But virtually nobody was able to predict how the Russian govern-
ment would handle the devaluation—which was by declaring default
on domestic debt and part of the international debt held by banks and
companies. This was by no means necessary, since basically there was
no debt crisis but only a currency crisis, which was supposed to be
resolved by devaluing the ruble.
As figure 11 suggests, the indebtedness of the Russian government
in recent years was growing, but not that significantly compared with
GDP (since GDP in dollar terms was growing rapidly due to the real
appreciation of the ruble). In absolute terms, the total government debt
by mid-1998 had not even reached the threshold of 60 percent of GDP.
Investors’ mistrust in the first half of 1998 was primarily associated
with the low credibility of the government’s plan to defend the ruble,
whereas the ability of the government to service its debt was not really
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questioned. The difference between the rates at which the Russian gov-
ernment borrowed abroad in hard currency (returns on Eurobonds
were around 15%) and the rates offered to the prime borrowers (7%)
was much lower than the gap between returns on ruble denominated
bonds (about 100% in real and dollar terms) and Eurobonds (15%).
Because the first gap indicates the country risk (i.e., the risk associated
with default by the government of this particular country) and the sec-
ond reflects the currency risk (i.e., the risk associated with the devalua-
tion), obviously the anticipation of the market at that time was that of
devaluation, but not of default.
Unfortunately, the default was not the only example of mismanage-
ment in handling the crisis. Shortly after the default, the CBR pro-
voked a run on the banks and a banking crisis. Banks already were
badly hurt by the devaluation (which was an inevitable cost they were
supposed to take), but also by the default (because they held a consid-
erable portion of their assets in short-term government securities, on
which the government defaulted, and also because they lost opportu-
nities for external financing after the government imposed a ninety-
day moratorium on servicing their external debts). To make matters
worse, the CBR introduced in early September a scheme to guarantee
personal deposits in commercial banks, which implied losses for the
depositors, especially for the holders of dollar accounts at private
banks.22 The run on the banks that naturally followed contributed to
the developing paralysis of the banking system. By September 1999,
banks were hardly processing any payments, and businesses were
starting to ask for cash. Even by mid-1999, nearly a year after the crisis,
the banking system was not yet restructured and businesses had prob-
lems getting their money out of the banks.
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Figure 11 Government debt, % of GDP
There are currently two prevailing (and not mutually exclusive)
explanations for the August 1998 currency crisis in Russia. One
stresses the unfortunate coincidence of events (Asian virus, a drop in
oil prices, political instability, etc.). Yevgeny Yasin, the minister with-
out portfolio in the former Kirienko government and a respected aca-
demic economist, says “the crisis is not just the result of the evil forces
or incompetence, but is caused by the coincidence of circumstances,
most of which were against us.”23 Sergey Kirienko himself even now
believes that even in June 1998, Russia had a chance to go through the
bumpy piece of the road avoiding the crisis, had the Duma only
accepted tax increases suggested by the government.24
Another explanation is that the crisis was caused by the budgetary
problems (persisting deficits resulting in mounting government debt)
or the “GKO pyramid.” No wonder the former high officials of the
Central Bank of Russia (CBR) take this view. “No doubt, the current
financial crisis is mostly of budgetary and debt origin,” states Sergey
Alexashenko, then deputy chairman of the CBR, in his recent book The
Battle for the Ruble.25 It is thus the government, not the CBR, to be
blamed, since it was only so much and so long that the CBR was able to
stick to the restrictive monetary policy without being supported by the
government, which continued to pursue loose fiscal policy. The con-
struction of the government debt pyramid was doomed to collapse
and eventually did collapse. It is pointed out that the returns on the
short-term government bonds (GKOs) were scandalously high, many
times higher than in the real sector, and that such a policy was driving
away resources from the real sector into purely financial speculations
in the market for government debt and the stock market.26 Financial
prosperity, not based on the foundations of a healthy real economy,
could not continue for long and finally came to an end in the form of
the crisis.
Such a view may be appropriate with respect to currency crises in
Latin America in the early 1980s (debt crisis) and, perhaps, even for the
1994 currency crisis in Mexico. However, in transition economies the
over-appreciation of exchange rates should be held responsible for
those crises. Unlike in Latin American countries, post-communist gov-
ernments were not considerably indebted and, unlike in Southeast
Asian countries, companies and banks in former centrally planned
economies did not manage to accumulate sizeable debts.27 Most com-
munist governments were quite prudent in accumulating external
debts; besides, for many countries external debts were written off on
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the eve of transition (Russia assumed all debts of the FSU so that other
newly created FSU states started their existence with no indebtedness
at all, part of Poland’s debt was written off, etc.). On the other hand,
companies and banks in transition economies (which under CPE were
not allowed to borrow abroad) do not have much of a credit history
and are just starting to accumulate foreign debts.
Only in four transition economies (Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia,
and Vietnam) were foreign debt to GDP ratios higher than 60 percent
(in 1996). Even in these economies, however, debt service payments
were quite low (because of debt restructuring) so that in no transition
economy did debt service payments exceed 20 percent of the export of
goods and services in 1996 (except Bulgaria at 20.5%). By way of com-
parison, debt service payments amounted to 30 – 40 percent of export
revenues for major Latin American countries and to 20–30 percent for
the largest Asian developing economies. Short-term debt in transition
states was relatively low as compared to total foreign debt, whereas
foreign exchange reserves, in most cases, exceeded substantially the
outstanding short-term indebtedness.28
In three out of eight countries that experienced the currency crisis
(Belarus, Bulgaria, and Russia) the reserves were barely enough to
cover the short-term debt, which obviously created an additional crisis
potential. However, in Romania, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and
Kazakhstan all debt indicators were perfect, so their crises appear, by
and large, as purely exchange rate crises. In Belarus, Bulgaria, and
especially in Russia, the exchange rate overvaluation was no doubt the
major reason for the crisis, as well.
True, government short term obligations, GKOs, ruble denominated
but held by non-residents, since early 1998 (according to available esti-
mates), exceeded total foreign exchange reserves, which was an obvi-
ous mismanagement and clearly contributed to the crisis. However,
the absolute value of the outstanding short-term debt held by the for-
eigners was by no means substantial — only $15 – 20 billion. The prob-
lem, rather, was the negligible amount of reserves ($15 billion), but
even under these circumstances it was possible to continue to service
the debt after, say, 50 percent devaluation (which would immediately
decrease debt service payments twice in dollar terms), not to speak
about the IMF credits that should have been given after devaluation,
not before. This was a sharp contrast to the Mexican situation in the
second half of 1994. Like in Russia, the value of outstanding short-term
government debt exceeded the amount of foreign exchange reserves.
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But unlike Russian GKOs, Mexican Tesobonos were denominated in
dollars, not in national currency, so devaluation of the peso could not
and did not decrease the dollar value of the debt.
To put it succinctly, the debt pyramid that the government was
building was supposed to collapse in some distant future (in three to
five years, perhaps) if the budget deficits would not have been brought
under control. However, the government still had some time and
space for maneuver before that, since debt indicators were not at a crit-
ical level; besides, even if they were, there is no economic rationale for
defaulting on domestic debt denominated in national currency, since
this debt can always be deflated through inflation (via monetary emis-
sion). On the other hand, even if there would have been no budget
deficits in 1995–98 and the government debt would have been steady,
the crisis should occur anyway just because of the inability to sustain
the balance of payments equilibrium with the overpriced exchange
rate.
The Western explanations of the Russian crisis, at least those that
appear outside the area studies field, are generally even less sophisti-
cated. It seems like the majority agreed that everything is so rotten in
Russia that it would be strange if the crisis did not happen. One varia-
tion of these views is that funds obtained by the state through domes-
tic and external borrowing were mishandled, if not embezzled or
stolen, and that overall the inefficient and corrupt system of the public
administration cannot ensure any kind of macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion, be it exchange rate based or money based. Oligarchs are not
thinking long-term anyway and are unable to agree on measures to
increase tax revenues to the state, slow down capital flight, or control
the indebtedness. “There is no honor among thieves,” writes Paul
Krugman, suggesting that the IMF – World Bank funds were just
wasted, if not stolen by the short-sighted and après-nous-le déluge-
minded oligarchs.29 The government is accused of playing in the inter-
ests of “oligarchs” — heads of large financial-industrial groups in the
Russian economy — that have effectively “privatized” the state and
care only about enriching themselves in the short run.
These explanations, however, to a large extent miss the point. There
is hardly any doubt that Russian state institutions were degrading in
recent years and that the weakening of the state institutions is the main
long-term factor explaining the poor performance of the Russian (and
CIS) economy as compared to China and Vietnam (with strong author-
itarian institutions) on the one hand and Central European countries
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(with strong democratic institutions) on the other. As a matter of fact, a
recent research study comparing twenty-eight transition economies,
including those of China and Vietnam, suggests that it is not the speed
of liberalization which should be held responsible for differing perfor-
mance but the institutional capacity of the state — a factor that was
overlooked by both schools of transition thought (by shock therapists
and by gradualists).30
Nevertheless, even though the institutional weakness is the single
most important long-term factor that contributed to the extreme magni-
tude of the Russian recession, it is not linked directly with the collapse
of the ruble and the failure of the macroeconomic stabilization pro-
gram. As argued earlier, the debt levels of the Russian government
and Russian companies were very modest by international standards:
even if the borrowed funds were embezzled, this could not and did not
lead to the debt and currency crises, since the critical point of really
excessive indebtedness was yet to be reached for at least several years.
No less important, there was no major change with respect to “crony-
ness,” corruption, and institutional weakness in recent years (except,
maybe, for some stabilization), so references to the criminal nature of
Russian capitalism cannot explain much.
Finally, the goal of maintaining the appropriate (not overvalued)
exchange rate is, perhaps, the least politicized issue of the government
economic policy: by keeping the ruble low through carrying out timely
and gradual devaluation, the government and the CBR were not risk-
ing any opposition (neither from industrial lobbies nor from oli-
garchs). While there are reasons to believe that macroeconomic
stabilization in Russia did not materialize in 1992 – 94 because of the
lack of consensus among powerful industrial lobbies on how to finance
cuts in government expenditure,31 there is no evidence whatsoever that
a low ruble strategy in 1995–98 was not acceptable because of political
considerations.
IV. Industrial Strategy—Import Substitution 
Instead of Export-Led Growth
While the low exchange rate of the ruble is an important device for
promoting exports and a necessary component of export-oriented
growth, there are other measures that could be introduced to create a
favorable environment for exporters. Unfortunately, Russia’s recent
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policy in this field resembled more import substitution efforts, putting
at a disadvantage exporting industries and enterprises.
In addition to some common patterns of structural change in the
economies in transition (rapid growth of the service sector, especially
of trade, banking, and financial services; reduction of the share of
investment in GDP and greater emphasis on consumer goods; conver-
sion of defense production, etc.), Russian restructuring is associated
with the reallocation of resources from secondary manufacturing into
raw materials industries. This approach is unique for the economies in
transition, at least on the scale currently evident in Russia.
The need to reallocate resources results from the huge gap in effi-
ciency and competitiveness between different sectors of the Russian
economy. While the fuel and energy sector and steel and nonferrous
metal industries are most efficient and competitive, agriculture,
machinery and equipment (with some minor exceptions), and light
industry are least efficient and competitive.32 In 1995, the Russian
resource sector (fuel and electric energy, steel and nonferrous metals)
employed only three million workers but produced nearly as much
output as machine-building, light industry, and agriculture together,
which employed a total of seventeen million workers. Labor produc-
tivity in the resource sector was more than five times higher than in
machinery and equipment and in agriculture; surprisingly, even capi-
tal productivity was slightly higher (Table 5). The actual productivity
gap should be even greater than suggested by the data in current
prices presented in Table 5 because domestic fuel and energy prices in
1995 were still only about 70 percent of world prices.
Before the reforms, inefficient sectors of the Russian/Soviet econ-
omy were subsidized directly and indirectly (through perverse price
structure). Because of the magnitude of the problem, it was unrealistic
to suddenly eliminate subsidies. After all, agriculture, machine-build-
ing, and light industry employed more than twenty million workers,
nearly 30 percent of the total. The more or less gradual removal of sub-
sidies to inefficient industries was the best feasible option. However,
the form in which those subsidies were provided (price subsidies, not
direct subsidies to producers for restructuring) was anything but opti-
mal.33
Now, as Russian domestic prices approached world price propor-
tions, the first part of the restructuring, associated with the reduction
of inefficient production, has already largely occurred. Due to changes
in relative prices favoring resource industries, their output was falling
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in recent years more slowly, and their exports increased in several
cases. As a result of price and output shifts, the share of resource
industries (fuel and energy, steel and nonferrous metals) in total
industrial output increased from 24 percent in 1991 to 51 percent in
1996 at the expense of the reduction of the share of secondary manu-
facturing, mostly machinery and equipment and light industries
(Table 6)
In fact, the resource sector has already become the backbone and
most important staple of the Russian economy. It accounts for about 80
percent of total exports to far abroad (40% fuel and energy, 30% metals
and diamonds, and 15% chemical and wood products) and for an even
greater share of exports to near abroad. The share of the fuel and
energy sector alone in total capital investment into goods-producing
industries increased from 20 percent in 1991 to about 40 percent in
1995 – 96 (Table 7). Gas and oil industry workers enjoy the highest
wages in the country — about $500 – $700 a month compared with
about $300 in banking and insurance, $170 on average, $140 in
machine-building, $90 in light industry, and below $80 in agriculture
in 1997.
Of the twenty largest Russian companies, eighteen are resource-
based and thirteen are energy-based (3 are steel mills, 1 is in nonfer-
rous metals, 1 is producing petrochemicals, and 2 are auto producers).
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Table 5 Employment, Capital Stock, and Output 
in Major Industrial Sectors, 1996
INDUSTRIES Employment, Fixed Gross Labor Capital
annual capital output, produc- produc-
average, stock, trillion tivity tivity
thousand year end, rubles
trillion
rubles* % of national average
RESOURCE (fuel, 
energy, metals) 2910 2054 585 331 97
MACHINERY & 
EQUIPMENT 
LIGHT INDUSTRY 6761 1019 267 65 90
AGRICULTURE 9800 2364 282 47 41
TOTAL ECONOMY 66000 13703 4009 100 100
* After revaluation of January 1, 1996.
Source: Goskomstat.
In 1996, their value added accounted altogether for over 10 percent of
Russian GDP and their gross output for 43 percent of Russian indus-
trial output, whereas their share in total employment was only 5 per-
cent and in industrial employment less than 20 percent.34
Gazprom, the second largest Russian company, producing more
than 500 billion cubic meters of gas (worth nearly $40 billion at world
prices) and sharply criticized for not paying enough taxes, in fact pro-
vided 26 percent of all federal budget revenues in 1996, while taxes
paid by the energy sector were 69 percent (compared with less than
20% in 1990).35 All taxes paid by oil-producing companies in 1996
amounted to 53 percent of gross output (by oil refineries to 55–56%, by
gas producers to 62%), whereas in developed countries the comparable
figure is 35 – 40 percent.36 Though Gazprom’s arrears to other enter-
prises and the government were much lower than the arrears of its
customers to Gazprom itself (i.e., the company was a net creditor),
under strong government pressure, it paid all tax arrears and contribu-
tions to its pension fund in May–June 1997 ($2.5 billion) by borrowing
in the international capital market, enabling the government to
increase tax revenues and to pay all previously delayed pensions.
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Table 6 Reduction of Output by Industry and 
the Structure of Industrial Output in Current Prices
Industries Volume of output Share of particular  Price
(1990=100%) industries in index
total output, % in 1994
(1990=1)
1992 1994 1995 1996 1990 1992 1995 1996
Fuel 87 69 68 66 8.0 19.4 17.6 19.0 5434
Electric energy 96 83 81 79 4.2 6.8 13.4 16.7 6071
Steel 77 54 59 57 8.6 10.1 9.5 3292
Non-ferrous metals 68 54 55 52 12.0 9.1 7.0 5.9 2088
Construction materials 78 47 43 32 3.1 2.4 3.6 3.5 2032
Food 76 57 52 47 11.7 9.4 11.3 10.7 1975
Chemicals 73 44 48 43 7.6 8.8 8.2 7.2 2889
Petrochemicals 2344
Wood 78 44 41 32 5.3 4.4 4.9 3.6 1752
Machinery and 77 45 40 37 30.8 20.4 17.7 15.8 2017
equipment
Light 64 26 18 13 12.1 7.1 2.4 1.8 875
Other — — — — 5.2 3.6 3.8 6.3 —
ALL INDUSTRY 75 51 48 46 100 100 100 100 2484
AGRICULTURE 86 73 67 62 — — — — 365
Source: Goskomstat.
The 1996–97 debate about the demonopolization of the gas industry
(perhaps by breaking Gazprom into several companies) revealed that
even Russian liberals oppose the plan. They pointed out that Gazprom
is one of the few successful companies in the Russian economy; that it
has to compete with the highly monopolized continental European gas
market; that it is not clear how to divide the foreign property of
Gazprom; and that the development of the Yamal gas fields requires
investment that exceeds the capabilities of smaller, “post-Gazprom”
companies, whereas the consortium of companies, though theoreti-
cally possible, has not yet been tried in practice.37
On the other hand, machinery and equipment and light industries
are rapidly losing their share of domestic market to foreign competi-
tors. The share of machinery and equipment in total Russian exports to
far abroad decreased from 17.6 percent in 1990 to 4–6 percent in 1994–
96. In 1994 alone, output in machine-building and light industry fell by
nearly half, and now these manufacturers produce less than 40 percent
and less than 15 percent respectively, of what they produced before the
recession (Table 6). Whereas employment in resource industries
increased by nearly half a million (15%), employment in machine-
building and light industry declined by more than five million (nearly
2 times) in 1990–95.
Russia’s restructuring is far from being complete. As its domestic
fuel prices finally caught up with the world level, the previous indus-
trial policy by default (together with the most odd fuel price subsidies)
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Table 7 Capital Investment by Industry, % of Total 
(Excluding Investment into Residential Construction and Social Sector)
Industrial complexes 1989 1991 1993 1994 1995 1996
USSR Russia
Fuel & energy 22 20 38 32 38 39
Steel & non-ferrous metals 4 5 7 7 8 7
Machine-building 12 10 5 6 6 5
Chemical & wood industries 5 5 4 4 4 4
Construction and construction 9 9 6 8 5 6
materials industry
Agro-industrial sector (agriculture, 29 32 19 18 8 10
food & light industry)
Transportation & communication 13 14 14 21 26 27
Other 6 5 7 4 5 2
Source: Goskomstat.
came to an end. The agenda for a sound new industrial policy is
twofold: (1) to redirect subsidies from inefficient to efficient industries
and (2) to replace remaining price subsidies with direct income subsi-
dies (or, in hopeless cases, by labor force and welfare programs).
The most heavily subsidized sector is agriculture. In 1995, it
received about $2 billion from the federal budget and another $3 bil-
lion from regional budgets—the amount equivalent to monthly wages
of agricultural employees (about $50 per employee a month, at the
time). If tax concessions and the government and central bank’s credits
(which are never paid back and periodically are written off) are taken
into account, the total amount of transfers to agriculture increases to
more than $14 billion, or nearly one-quarter of gross revenues of the
whole sector.38 Because the bulk of all transfers went to former collec-
tive and state farms that, in 1995, produced just slightly more than half
of total agricultural output (peasants’ households accounted for
another 43% of output, and independent farms for 2%), it turns out
that value added in large agricultural enterprises is close to zero, if not
negative.
At the other pole, few fairly competitive, or potentially competitive,
secondary manufacturing industries (i.e., those that can quickly
become competitive with reasonable investment) account for only a
tiny part of government subsidies. The aerospace industry, especially
the companies that produce defense aircraft, is perhaps the most
notable example. In 1995 – 96, Russian exports of armaments, after
plummeting to less than $2 billion in 1994, increased to over $3 billion
a year, according to official Russian statistics ($4 billion according to
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and $6 billion
according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service): it is estimated
that half of this export consists of aircraft and parts. Sukhoy, the lead-
ing Russian aircraft exporter, is expected to sell 444 fighters in 1997 –
2006 for some $17 billion, which is equivalent to 15 percent of the
world market.39 In 1995, Russia exported seventy out of seventy-six
produced helicopters; production capacity is estimated at around 300.
Civil aircraft producers seem less competitive; export in 1994
amounted to only $200 million, and production here nearly ended
after Russian air companies stopped buying planes because of the
shortage of funds. Eighteen aeroplane plants that manufactured about
400 planes annually in the 1980s, produced only ten civil aircraft and
about ten defense aircraft in 1996.40 Hopes for a breakthrough are now
linked to several joint projects with major Western aviation companies.
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In the area of space technology, Russian producers so far managed
to penetrate the market for commercial launchers of satellites (about 20
were launched in 1997) and to secure some financing from the United
States and from Russian commercial banks for the joint Alfa project,
which allows Russia to continue its development of the space lab.
Unfortunately, the Russian aerospace industry does not receive any
sort of special treatment from the government. Programs to support
conversion are coming to an end, and other budgetary sources to
finance the restructuring are simply not available. Direct subsidies to
both defense and non-defense aircraft producers seemed to be in the
range of $100 million in 1995 and could not, therefore, make a substan-
tial difference. Instead, the State Committee on Machine Building
(Roskommash) was working hard to organize domestic production of
goods that used to be imported from former Soviet republics and from
far abroad. Production capacities for forty-six such items, including
commuter trains, busses, mini-tractors, pulp and paper machinery,
and magnetic tomographs have recently been created. And the import
substitution program calls for establishing capacities for another fifty-
seven items not yet produced in Russia.41
In the late 1920s, when the New Economic Policy (NEP), which
allowed the existence of the market economy, was about to be rolled
back, there were debates between two schools of planners — the
genetic and the teleologist. The former suggested that planning should
be indicative rather than directive; that it should be market-conform-
ing, following trends identified by the market itself; and that industri-
alization should start from light industry and proceed gradually as
savings (generated in a natural way) became available. The teleolo-
gists, on the other hand, argued that planners should not feel con-
strained by the objective laws and potentials of the economy. Nor
should they rely on slow and obsolete markets. Instead, they should
speed up development by mobilizing savings through price controls
and directive planning in order to quickly create the nonexistent heavy
industry that would allow the industrialization of the country.
This latter view became the official policy; as a result, the industrial-
ization of the 1930s and beyond became a major isolationist import
substitution experiment. From then on, the share of export in Soviet
GDP did not increase until large-scale fuel sales abroad started in the
1970s. The huge perverted industrial structure created without regard
to costs and prices of the world market proved to be stillborn and non-
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viable in 1992, when it finally faced foreign competition after half a
century of artificial isolation.
Today, Russia is choosing once again between export-oriented
growth and protection autarchy. On the one hand there is the example
of East Asian countries, which relied on export as a locomotive of eco-
nomic growth: in China, for instance, the share of export in GDP
increased from 5 percent in 1978 to 23 percent in 1994, while the GDP
itself grew at an average rate of about 10 percent. On the other hand
are North Korea, an unappealing example of isolationism; other social-
ist countries and developing countries of socialist orientation (which
were creating their own heavy industries following the advice of, and
using assistance from, the Soviet Union); India (where the share of
export in GDP remained frozen at a level of 6% from the 1950s to the
1980s); and many Latin American countries.
The promotion of export-oriented growth would require massive
and rapid industrial restructuring — mostly in favor of resource-based
industries, but also in favor of some competitive high-tech sectors
(aerospace) and, perhaps, particular capital and labor-intensive indus-
tries at the expense of agriculture and most secondary manufacturing
industries. It is more efficient to make the needed cuts at once (and to
support people through social and manpower programs instead of
subsidizing noncompetitive companies) than to make them over time,
thus forcing inefficient industries to die gradually. Rapid growth of the
resource sector may provide rent (partly appropriated by the resource
sector itself, partly by the government) for investments needed to
restructure some few still promising secondary manufacturing indus-
tries and enterprises. (Gazprom and major oil companies are already
trying to diversify by purchasing fuel-equipment-producing compa-
nies.) This radical option, however, may not be completely politically
feasible since the inefficient sectors suffering from the competition of
imported goods (agriculture and machine-building) account for a
much larger share of total employment than efficient sectors and exer-
cise considerable influence in the corridors of power.
The other option — continuing support to major noncompetitive
industries — is a slower and more costly way of restructuring, imply-
ing the preservation of subsidies to and protection of weak producers.
Paradoxically, this option, despite the intentions of its advocates claim-
ing that it will stop the deindustrialization of the country, may lead to
exactly the opposite. Poor performance of the resource sector will not
generate enough revenue to support all noncompetitive industries.
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The result will be that even the few still-competitive or potentially
competitive secondary manufacturing industries will fail to get neces-
sary support and will slowly disintegrate.
V. Promoting Foreign Direct Investment
A major missed opportunity has been the failure to attract foreign
direct investment into resource projects. In 1989 – 96, Russia received
some $5 billion of foreign direct investment, which is equivalent to
about 1 percent of its annual GDP, compared with 30 percent of GDP
in Hungary and China and 5–15 percent in Albania, Azerbaijan, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Turkmenistan.42 The rea-
sons for poor Russian performance in this area are well known: politi-
cal instability, high inflation and unstable currency, incomplete and
frequently modified legislation, poor infrastructure, and so on. Never-
theless, the fact is that Russia failed to use its “resource advantages” to
bring in foreign capital: huge rent in resource industries provides com-
pensation for political and economic risks, so foreign investors are less
sensitive to economic, political, and legal uncertainty. Oil-rich Azer-
baijan, for instance, in 1989 – 96 managed to attract $0.9 billion of for-
eign direct investment (equivalent to over 20% of GDP) even under
conditions of the ongoing war, while resource-rich Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan attracted nearly $3 billion and $0.5 billion, or 13 percent
and 11 percent, respectively.43
By contrast, Russia in recent years failed to prevent the reduction of
investment and output even in competitive resource industries (oil
and gas included), which should be viewed as a major failure of the
government policy. Some major resource projects have been debated
for nearly a decade with little practical progress, while the crucial law
on the list of projects eligible for the production-sharing agreement
was discussed for two years by the parliament, and only seven projects
were approved in 1997. The major reason for minimal progress is prob-
ably the outmoded mentality that it is better not to use the resources at
all than to sell them at a “low” price, in the belief that the policy-mak-
ers know better than the international market the “real” price of
resource projects and joint ventures. There is also the unwillingness
“to allow foreigners to get rich on Russian resources.” However,
investments were needed yesterday and are needed now. Every day of




The comparison of inflows of foreign direct investment in transition
economies reveals that they are not correlated with domestic invest-
ment, especially for the group of countries in which cumulative FDI
inflows for 1989–96 constitute less than 5 percent of GDP (fig. 11). The
reason may be that domestic and foreign investments are influenced
by different factors. Indeed, in some countries, high investment/GDP
ratios were maintained without much FDI; Belarus may be one exam-
ple, while China of the 1980s is the other. Only in the 1990s did China
become the leader among transition economies in attracting foreign
investment.
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Figure 12 GDP change and the inflow of FDI in 1989-96 
(for China - 1979-86) as a % of GDP
Source: Statistical Appendix
Similarly, the inflow of FDI does not seem to be really correlated
with general economic performance — the GDP change (fig. 11). How-
ever, for eight countries (Albania, Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Turkmenistan) in which the cumu-
lative inflow of FDI in 1989 – 96 was higher than 5 percent of GDP,
some correlation between FDI inflows and performance may be
observed. If this is the case, there are even more reasons to argue that
the failure to attract substantial FDI contributed to Russia’s poor eco-
nomic performance during transition.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The greater magnitude of the Russian recession should be attributed in
part to worse pre-reform initial conditions. Distortions in industrial
structure and trade patterns inherited from the era of central planning
were larger in FSU countries than in EE countries and much larger
than in China and Vietnam. In particular, the collapse of inter-republi-
can trade within FSU states was largely inevitable and contributed
greatly to the general reduction of output.
Policy factors responsible for the greater reduction of output in Rus-
sia are associated mostly with the rapid decline of the institutional
capacity of the state. After factoring initial conditions into the regres-
sion equations, it turns out that differences in the degree of liberaliza-
tion do not really matter, whereas the institutional capacity of the state
(as measured by the decline in government revenues and the growth
of the shadow economy), as well as the variations in the rates of infla-
tion, explain a great deal.
External economic policy has an important impact on performance
as well, insofar as it helps to increase exports and improve current
account balance (these variables are significant even after factoring in
initial conditions and institutional factors) and to attract FDI.
It is argued that the major drawback of external economic policy
was the inability of the Russian government to stimulate exports
through pursuing export-oriented industrial policy and maintaining
the low exchange rate of the ruble. Instead of creating favorable condi-
tions for competitive industries (resource-based and a few high-tech),
the government used rent extracted from the fuel and energy sector to
support the least efficient production in heavy engineering and agri-
culture. Russian industrial policy was largely a failure — partly
because it took the most inefficient form of price subsidies (instead of
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direct subsidies) and partly because it failed to support investment in
competitive resource industries and to allocate funds to those few
high-tech industries (aerospace) that had good prospects for becoming
competitive.
Furthermore, in 1995, the macroeconomic stabilization was
achieved by using the exchange rate of the ruble as a nominal anchor,
which led to the apparent overvaluation of the national currency:
Russian prices exceeded 70 percent of the American level (i.e., became
higher than in virtually all transition economies and in most countries
with a similar GDP per capita). As a result, Russian exports — one of
the few indicators that was still growing in real terms — stopped
expanding by 1997, the current account deteriorated sharply, the Rus-
sian ruble came under pressure from international investors, and the
currency crisis broke out in August 1998. It was caused not by the
Asian contagion but by the wrong macroeconomic policy — the
attempts to maintain the exchange rate at an unsustainably high level.
The way the Russian government handled the crisis — declaring
default on short-term and, later, on long-term debt and manufacturing
the banking crisis through clumsy moves to provide partial guarantees
to depositors—added insult to injury.
Another major shortcoming in the external economic policy area
was the inability to attract FDI. The experience of other resource-rich
transition economies (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) sug-
gests that Russia obviously failed to use its resource advantages in this
respect.
Overall, while the most important reasons for the extreme costs of
transition in Russia were associated with poor initial conditions and
with the collapse of institutions, the mishandling of the international-
ization process of the Russian economy in the 1990s definitely had a
substantial impact. In fact, it may account for as much as one-fourth
(10 percentage points) of the more than 40 percent decline in GDP dur-
ing transition.
Future prospects for strong export growth and the inflow of FDI are
not particularly encouraging. Quick progress in adopting an export-
oriented growth strategy does not seem to be politically feasible, but
some steps in this direction are more or less inevitable, especially in the
longer term. There is, however, one certainty: rapid economic growth
without major progress in export-oriented restructuring supported by
the low exchange rate of the ruble is extremely unlikely. 
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Table 1A GDP per Capita, GDP Change, Liberalization Index, 
Inflation, Exports, Current Account and FDI in Transition Economies
COUNTRY 1987–88 1996 GDP Cumulative Share of Share of CA level, FDI Inflation,
PPP GDP as a % of EBRD export export average for inflow in in 1990–95,
per capita, 1989 GDP liberali- in GDP, in GDP, 1993–95; % 1989–96, geometric
% of the zation 1989, % 1995, % % of 1995 average,
US level index GDP % a year
Albania 6.8 87 2.3 5 9.4 –2.8 13.5 76.4
Belarus 25.1 63 1.07 47.3 22.5 –1.6 0.5 878.8
Bulgaria 23.5 68 2.96 30.1 41.2 –2.6 3.6 81.2
China* 5.8 189 2 6.5 9.0 –1.7 2.0 4
Czech Republic 44.1 89 3.61 38.5 48.4 –0.4 14.8 18.3
Estonia 29.9 69 2.93 32.9 46.1 –2.9 17.6 151.4
Hungary 28.9 86 4.11 34.1 28.7 –8.9 30.3 22.3
Kazakhstan 24.2 45 1.31 23.5 24.3 –3.3 12.9 805.5
Kyrghyzstan 13.5 52 1.81 32.3 13.5 –7.6 4.8 337.3
Latvia 24.1 52 2.39 41.4 21.6 3.5 9.7 149.1
Lithuania 33.8 42 2.62 45.5 38.2 –3.8 4.3 241.4
Moldova 22.4 35 1.62 33 21.2 –2.3 4.3 355
Mongolia 5 83 2.27 19 37.6 5.4 4.4 126.7
Poland 21.4 104 4.14 19.6 19.5 –4.4 4.2 34.9
Romania 22.7 88 2.35 17.6 21.2 –3.3 4.0 158.4
Russia 30.6 51 1.92 18.3 23.6 2.1 1.5 517
Slovakia 33** 90 3.53 48.7 49.3 1.4 4.4 16
Slovenia 33.3 96 4.16 51.7 44.7 1.7 3.9 62.1
Turkmenistan 18.7 57 0.63 35.6 62.8 11.3 11.3 1167
Ukraine 20.4 42 0.8 29 17.0 –0.3 1.5 1040.5
Uzbekistan 12.5 84 1.11 28.5 17.6 –1.2 1.6 628.4
Vietnam 2** 156 3.72 20.5 24.7 –8.6 1.4 26.3
Armenia 26.5 39 1.44 28.4 13.2 –7.5 2.3 896.6
Azerbaijan 21.7 38 1.03 33.9 17.6 –5.8 26.4 747.6
Croatia 30** 70 4.02 49.5 25.6 –2.6 3.1 328
Georgia 26.5** 31 1.32 28.9 14.9 –6.9 2.3 2280.2
Macedonia FYR 25** 56 3.92 57.5 63.0 1.9 397.9
Tajikistan 12.1 37 0.95 35.9 37.5 –4.9 2.8 399.1
* For China—all indicators are for the period 10 years earlier.
** Estimate.
Source: World Bank, 1996a, b; 1997b; De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996; EBRD, 1995,




Table 2A Distortions in Industrial Structure and Trade Patterns* 
as a % of GDP in the late 1980s (for China—late 1970s)
COUNTRY Distortions (as a % of GDP) in:
ALL ALL DIS-
Defense Industrial Trade Trade Trade TRADE TORTIONS
expen- structure openness within between DISTOR- IN IN-
diture (share of (share of FSU socialist TIONS DUSTRIAL




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]=[3]+ [7]=[1]+
[4]+[5]x0.33 [2]+[6]
Albania 1.6 12.3 25 0 2.3 25.8 39.7
Belarus 9.4 28.3 –20.3 41 3.5 21.9 59.6
Bulgaria 10.4 27.3 –3.1 0 16.1 2.2 39.9
China** 1.8 24.5 8.5 0 0.6 8.7 35
Czech Republic 4.5 19.2 –15.5 0 24 –7.6 16.1
Estonia 9.4 21.3 21.1 30.2 1.5 51.8 82.5
Hungary 3.5 7.3 –11.1 0 13.7 –6.6 4.2
Kazakhstan 9.4 20.3 6.5 20.8 1.5 27.8 57.5
Kyrghyzstan 9.4 19.4 2.7 27.7 2.6 31.3 60.1
Latvia 9.4 21.3 2.6 36.7 2.1 40.0 70.7
Lithuania 9.4 23.9 –1.5 40.9 2.6 40.3 73.6
Moldova 9.4 26.3 11 28.9 2.3 40.7 76.4
Mongolia 5.3 16.3 11 0 17.3 16.7 38.3
Poland 4.4 22.3 12.4 0 8.4 15.2 41.9
Romania 0.8 30.3 12.4 0 3.7 13.6 44.7
Russia 9.4 14.9 2.7 11.1 4.0 15.1 39.4
Slovakia 4.5 19.2 –4.7 0 41 8.8 32.5
Slovenia 0 4.2 –7.7 0 25 0.6 4.8
Turkmenistan 9.4 23.4 –0.6 33 1.5 32.9 65.7
Ukraine 9.4 22.3 3 23.8 2.9 27.8 59.5
Uzbekistan 9.4 21.4 1.5 25.5 1.7 27.6 58.4
Vietnam 15.7 11.7 –5.5 0 10.2 –2.1 25.3
Armenia 9.4 23.3 15.6 25.6 1.6 41.7 74.4
Azerbaijan 9.4 23.3 –6.9 29.8 2.3 23.7 56.4
Croatia 0 12.3 –5.5 0 25 2.8 15.0
Georgia 9.4 22.3 6.1 24.8 2.3 31.7 63.4
Macedonia FYR 0 12.3 –13.5 0 21 –6.6 5.7
Tajikistan 9.4 25.4 –0.9 31 2.7 31.0 65.8
* Distortions in the share of defense expenditure are equal to the actual share of defense expenditure in GDP minus
3.7% (considered as the “normal” level). Distortions in industrial structure are computed as the sum of deviations of
the share of each of three sectors (agriculture, industry, services) in GDP from the “normal” level—all deviations
were taken with the positive sign and divided by two; “normal” level was defined as the average for the group of
market economies with comparable PPP GDP per capita. Distortions in trade openness are equal to the “normal”
share of external trade in GDP (defined in a similar way—as an average share for the group of market economies
with comparable population and GDP per capita) minus the actual share divided by two. Distortions in trade within
FSU are equal to exports plus imports from former Soviet republics as a share of GDP divided by two (for non-FSU
countries these distortions are assumed to be equal to zero). Finally, distortions in trade with socialist countries are
equal to the sum of export to and import from socialist countries (trade between Czech and Slovak Republics and
among former Yugoslav republics is also included) as a share of GDP divided by two. These latter distortions are
included into the computation of total trade and industrial structure distortions with a weight of 33%.
** For China—all indicators are for the period 10 years earlier.
Source: De Melo, Denizer, Gelb, 1995; EBRD, 1995, 1996; Goskomstat-USSR; Goskomstat-Russia; Statistical Handbook
(World Bank, 1995); A Study of the Soviet Economy (IMF, 1991); PlanEcon; Impetus and Present Situation of Viet-
namese Society, 1996; UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1995b; World Bank, 1996a; World Bank, 1996b.
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Table 3A Total Revenues of Consolidated Government Budgets 
(including off-budget funds) as a % of GDP in Economies in Transition





Central European 51.2 51.6 47.4 49.1 49.0 49.4 48.0 45.5
Countries***
—Czech Republic 61.7 60.2 52.2 49.5 51.4 51.2 49.6 44.5 18 12
—Slovak Republic 43.6 46.4 46.8 44.6
—Hungary 59.1 53.9 52.1 56.1 55.4 53.9 49.6 47.0 29 1
—Poland 41.4 42.9 41.5 44.1 47.6 48.3 47.8– 46.8– 15 0
—Slovenia 42.4 49.3 43.7 46.5 47.1 47.1 46.2 44.4
Baltic states*** 47.2 41.8 38.3 31.4 35.2 33.5 33.4 —
—Estonia 39.5 35.7 36.4 34.6 39.6 41.2 40.7 – 25 13
—Latvia 52.0 46.0 37 27.4 35.8 34.2 34.9 – 34 22
—Lithuania 50.0 43.7 41.4 32.1 30.2 25.1 24.6 – 29 17
European CIS countries 46.8 32.1 33.0 35.7 33.5 32.0
(excluding Russia)***
—Belarus 38.2 47.5 44.0 43.6 48.4 43.2 41.0 19 7
—Moldova 35.3 — — 20.2 13.0 23.1 23.9 23 40 28
—Ukraine 58.2 — — — 42.3 — — — 46 34
—USSR(1988–90)/
RUSSIA (1992–95)** 43.5 47.2 – 28.0 29.0 28.2 26.1 23 40 28
South East Europe 52.3 47.0 36.6 33.5 36.0 39.9 37.8 31.2
countries***
—Albania 47.8 47.1 30.9 25.6 34.6 33 24 17.8
—Bulgaria 58.0 53.3 42.3 32.4 37.2 40.2 36.0 – 29 6
—Croatia — — 34 34 33.6 43.8 50.6* —
—FYR Macedonia — — — 38.0 41.0 51.0 45 44.5
—Romania 51.1 40.5 39.3 37.6 33.6 31.4 33.5 — 17 –5
Caucasian states*** 28.6 32.9 31.4 33.4 18.9 10.8 —
—Azerbaijan 25.8 – 35.7 49.2 47 21.2 13 16 58 46
—Georgia 31.5 – 30.0 13.6 19.8 16.6 8.5 – 64 52
Central Asian 35.2 38.8 35.6 24.9 25.9 28.9 21.6 20.0
countries***
—Kazakhstan 35.4 32.8 25.0 24.6 23.5 17.2 16.5 15.3 34 22
—Kyrgyzstan 38.0 38.6 35 17 23 20.8 15.6 —
—Tajikistan 40.3 — 33.2 26.6 27.1 45.5 19.3 12.3
—Turkmenistan 32.4 — — — 13.4 — — —
—Uzbekistan 35.0 44.9 49.1 31.4 42.6 32.3 35.1 32.3 10 –2
Asian non-CIS 27.2 24.1
countries***
—China**** 19.3 19.1 16.9 14.7 13.8 12.4 — — 20 0
—Mongolia 48.6 — — — 36.2 — — —
—Vietnam 14.8 — — — 22.3 — — —
* Estimate.
** Excluding revenues of the off-budget social insurance funds. If these revenues are included, total government rev-
enues amounted to about 36% in 1993 and 1994.
*** Unweighted average.
**** Data do not include revenues of neither fiscal off-budget funds (which increased from 2.6% of GDP in 1978 to 4.2%
of GDP in 1994), nor enterprise extra-budgetary funds, which amounted to over 10% of GDP in 1992 and which since
1993 are not included into extra-budgetary revenues by the Chinese official statistics. From 1979 to 1985 government
revenues, including fiscal off-budget funds, decreased from 35% to 30% of GDP (see World Bank, 1995c, p.31–32).
Source: EBRD, 1995, 1996, 1997; Economic Systems, Vol.19, No.2, June 1995, p.103; Goskomstat; De Melo, Denizer,
Gelb, 1995, table 8; World Bank, 1996b; China Statistical Yearbook 1995. State Statistical Bureau, 1995, p. 223; Warsaw
School of Economics, 1997.Transition (World Bank), April 1977, p.6.
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Table 4A Regression of Change in GDP on Non-policy and Policy-related
Factors (all coefficients are significant at 6% level except those in brackets)
Dependent variable = log (1996 GDP as a % of 1989 GDP)
For China—all indicators are for the period of 1979–86 or similar
Equations, Number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 9, 10, 
of observations / N=28 N=28 N=28 N=28 N=28 N=28 N=28 N=28 N=27 N=17 N=17
Variables
Constant 3.66 5.37 5.44 5.23 4.96 5.55 5.71 4.77 4.47 5.84 4.82
Distortions, % of 
GDPa –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01
1987 PPP GDP per –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01
capita, % of the US 
level
War dummyb –.24 –.63 –.58 –.40 –.40 –.39 –.27
Decline in –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01 –.01
government revenues 
as a % of GDP from 
1989–91 to 1993–96
Liberalization index .21 (.00) (.03) (.07) (–0.4)
Log (Inflation, % a –.23 –.14 –.12 –.14 –.10 –.09 –.12 –.10
year, 1990–95, 
Geometric average) 
Log (1996 $ export as (.14)c .21 .21
a % of 1992)
Current account .02
balance, average for 
1993–95, % of GDP
Shadow economy as –.01 –.01
a % of GDP in 1994
Adjusted R2, % 28 65 78 75 75 84 84 86 89 90 93
aCumulative measure of distortions as a % of GDP equal to the sum of defense expenditure (minus
3% regarded as the “normal” level), deviations in industrial structure and trade openness from the
‘normal’ level, the share of heavily distorted trade (among the FSU republics) and lightly distorted
trade (with socialist countries) taken with a 33% weight (see table 2A in the Appendix and Popov
1998a, b for details).
bEquals 1 for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, and Tajikistan and 0 for all other
countries.
cSignificant at 10% level.
